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 Stare Decisis and Constitutional 
Supremacy: Will Our Charter Past 
Become an Obstacle to Our  
Charter Future? 
Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., Sheila M. Tucker and  
Alison M. Latimer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Thirty years ago, the enactment of the Constitution Act, 1982, Part I 
of which was the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 was a 
transformative moment in Canada’s development as a constitutional 
democracy. It guaranteed a set of civil rights and freedoms (which had 
hitherto not been constitutionally entrenched and which many viewed as 
ill-protected under the Canadian Bill of Rights2) and, by the addition of 
section 52 to the Constitution Act, gave expression to the principle of 
constitutional supremacy in providing that “any law that is inconsistent 
with the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force 
and effect”.3 
In the early days of Charter jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of 
Canada made clear that the Charter represented a departure from the 
timorous approach to rights protection that prevailed under the Canadian 
Bill of Rights. So, for example, in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., in the 
context of freedom of religion, the Supreme Court of Canada held that 
unlike the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Charter “does not simply ‘recog-
                                                                                                             
* Joseph J. Arvay, Q.C., is the managing partner of Arvay Finlay, Barristers, Vancouver, 
B.C. Sheila M. Tucker is associate counsel with Davis LLP, Vancouver, B.C. Alison M. Latimer is 
an associate with Arvay Finlay. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III. See, e.g., 
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1998), at c. 35.5 and 
36.1. 
3 R. v. Conway, [2010] S.C.J. No. 22, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765, at para. 65 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Conway”]. 
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nize and declare’ existing rights as they were circumscribed by legisla-
tion current at the time of the Charter’s entrenchment. The language of 
the Charter is imperative.”4 However, 30 years on, many legal observers 
have questioned the courts’ success in giving full force to the imperatives 
of the Charter. Joel Bakan describes the conundrum as follows: 
The Charter’s potentially radical and liberatory principles of equality, 
freedom, and democracy are administered by a fundamentally 
conservative institution — the legal system — and operate in social 
conditions that routinely undermine their realization.5 
That said, there really cannot be any doubt that the Supreme Court of 
Canada (and indeed, the many lower courts throughout the country) has 
made any number of decisions under the Charter that have had very 
significant emancipatory impacts in Canada. The Court has matured into 
an authoritative institution of constitutional review; but once old enough 
to have a past, a body is defined, in part, by its relationship to that past. 
We have been asked to provide a paper dealing with the broad topic 
of transformative Charter moments. Transformative means “a thorough 
or dramatic change”.6 This paper considers stare decisis — an inherently 
conservative doctrine that champions the goals of consistency, certainty 
and predictability in the law. Admittedly, stare decisis appears to operate 
in direct contradiction to the spirit of our assigned topic. Indeed, an 
examination of the role of stare decisis in Charter litigation reveals some 
transformative Charter moments lost. The core concern of this paper is to 
point out that very fact, and to consider some means for minimizing that 
effect. 
Although we examine both the “horizontal” and the “vertical” con-
ventions of stare decisis, we focus on the latter and thus the extent to 
which lower courts may depart from prior decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Canada addressing similar legal issues in the wake of a sea 
change in legislative and social facts.7 Our purpose is to offer an ap-
proach to this doctrine that allows for the goals of stare decisis to be met 
while giving effect to the constitutionally entrenched principle of 
constitutional supremacy which, of necessity, must leave room for the 
                                                                                                             
4 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at para. 115 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”]. 
5 Joel Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1997), at 3. 
6 Oxford Concise English Dictionary, 9th ed., 1996, at 1481. 
7 That stare decisis applies at all in Charter litigation is assumed for the purpose of this 
paper. However, we note that the more radical proposition that stare decisis has no application at all 
in light of the imperative of constitutional supremacy is worthy of some debate. 
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Charter’s liberatory principles to be interpreted and applied in the face of 
changing social and other conditions. We will argue that this approach 
enhances sound judicial administration and the legitimacy and accept-
ability of the common law — other principles at the core of stare 
decisis.8 It also ensures that there will continue to be transformative 
Charter moments as evolving contexts require. 
The force of stare decisis in these circumstances was an issue of cen-
tral importance in the recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Bed-
ford.9 We hope to persuade the reader that the Court of Appeal wrongly 
concluded that stare decisis applies to prevent lower courts from making 
a new decision under the Charter when faced with a fundamental change 
in the social and legislative facts underpinning the prior Supreme Court 
of Canada decision. As a result of this error, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
lost an important opportunity to participate in a transformative moment 
in Charter history. This issue is of great practical and immediate impor-
tance. It has already become an issue in determining whether the trial 
judge presently seized of a case challenging the absolute prohibition 
against physician-assisted dying (Carter v. Canada (Attorney General)10 
can differ from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodri-
guez v. British Columbia (Attorney General).11 From a broader perspec-
tive, it is also an issue of enormous pragmatic significance for litigants 
                                                                                                             
8 Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 2012 ONCA 186, at para. 
56 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Bedford”], citing David Polowin Real Estate Ltd. v. Dominion of 
Canada General Insurance Co., [2005] O.J. No. 2436, 76 O.R. (3d) 161, at paras. 119-120 (Ont. 
C.A.). 
9 At issue in Bedford, id., was the constitutional validity of ss. 210, 212(1)(j) and 213(1)(c) 
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario took the 
position that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Prostitu-
tion Reference”], coupled with the principle of stare decisis, prevented the application judge from 
considering or reconsidering the constitutional validity of ss. 210 and 213(1)(c). The Ontario Court 
of Appeal concluded in Bedford, at para. 52, that “the application judge did not err in considering 
whether or not the bawdy house [s. 210] and communicating provisions [s. 213(1)(c)] violate s. 7 of 
the Charter“ because both the legal issues raised and the legal framework to be applied were 
different than they were at the time of the Prostitution Reference. However, the Ontario Court of 
Appeal found that “the application judge erred in reconsidering whether or not the communicating 
provision [s. 213(1)(c)] is an unjustified infringement of s. 2(b) of the Charter. The Supreme Court 
definitively decided this issue in the Prostitution Reference, and only that court may revisit it.” 
10 [2012] B.C.J. No. 886, 2012 BCSC 886 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter “Carter”]. The authors of 
this paper, along with Grace Pastine, act as counsel for the plaintiffs in Carter. 
11 [1993] S.C.J. No. 94, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Rodriguez”]. There are 
many reasons why Rodriguez is not an impediment to the trial judge seized of Carter reaching a 
different conclusion on the constitutional questions asked. These reasons include that different legal 
arguments have been advanced and that there have been changes in the law since the judgment in 
Rodriguez was rendered. However, a full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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deciding whether to undertake a Charter case at all in the face of an 
ostensibly binding Supreme Court of Canada decision. 
II. THE ROLE OF STARE DECISIS 
The Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, United States Customs 
Court, explained stare decisis as follows: 
The doctrine, from stare decisis et non quieta movere, “stand by the 
decision and do not disturb what is settled,” is rooted in the common 
law policy that a principle of law deduced from a judicial decision will 
be considered and applied in the determination of a future similar case. 
In essence, this policy refers to the likelihood that a similar or like case 
arising in the future will be decided in the same way.12 
The doctrine has a horizontal axis and a vertical axis, both of which will 
be described briefly below. In “Precedent Unbound?”, Debra Parkes 
explains: 
As things have developed in Canada, the concept of “binding 
precedent” is limited to the vertical convention. Courts lower in the 
applicable hierarchy are bound to follow decisions of a higher court. 
The concept of stare decisis is used more broadly to apply to decisions 
of higher courts (the vertical convention) and to previous decisions of 
the same court, albeit often differently constituted (the horizontal 
convention). In the latter case decisions are not strictly binding, but 
should be followed unless there are compelling reasons to overrule 
them.13 
Next we discuss how Canadian courts have treated these conventions. 
1. Horizontal Convention of Stare Decisis 
The horizontal convention of stare decisis refers to the extent to which 
a court will overrule one of its own earlier judgments.14 This issue has 
arisen a number of times at the Supreme Court of Canada, most recently 
                                                                                                             
12 Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, United States Customs Court, “Stare Decisis” 
(paper presented at a seminar for Federal Appellate Judges sponsored by the Federal Judicial Center, 
May 13-16, 1975), at 1-2. 
13 Debra Parkes, “Precedent Unbound? Contemporary Approaches to Precedent in Canada” 
(2006-2008) 32 Man. L.J. 135, at 137 [hereinafter “Precedent Unbound?”]. 
14 “Precedent Unbound?”, id., at 146. 
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in Health Services and Support – Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn. 
v. British Columbia15 and Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser.16 
Health Services was itself a significant transformative “moment” in 
Supreme Court of Canada history, in that the Court reversed a trilogy of 
decisions holding that section 2(d) of the Charter (freedom of associa-
tion) did not extend to collective bargaining.17 In Health Services, the 
Court overruled the 20-year-old labour trilogy, concluding that the 
reasons given therein for not extending the protection simply could not 
withstand “principled scrutiny”18 and that a failure to protect collective 
bargaining was inconsistent with both Canada’s “historic recognition of 
the importance of collective bargaining to freedom of association” and 
international law.19 In light of these considerations, the Court held that, 
on a correct interpretation, section 2(d) of the Charter did protect the 
right to bargain collectively. 
Four short years later, in Fraser,20 Rothstein J. (dissenting on this 
point though concurring in the result), would have overturned Health 
Services and reverted to the law established in the labour trilogy — that 
is, that section 2(d) of the Charter does not protect collective bargaining. 
Justice Rothstein affirmed the right of the Supreme Court of Canada to 
reverse itself and noted that “the courts have set down, and academics 
have suggested, a plethora of criteria for courts to consider in deciding 
between upholding precedent and correcting error”.21 Justice Rothstein 
considered this “non-exhaustive” list of criteria and concluded that: 
Fundamentally, the question in every case involves a balancing: Do the 
reasons in favour of following a precedent — such as certainty, 
consistency, predictability and institutional legitimacy — outweigh the 
need to overturn a precedent that is sufficiently wrong that it should not 
be upheld and perpetuated?22 
                                                                                                             
15 [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”]. 
16 [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fraser”]. 
17 That trilogy of cases included: Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act 
(Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v. 
Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.); and Retail, Wholesale and Department 
Store Union v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
collectively “the labour trilogy”]. 
18 Health Services, supra, note 15, at para. 22. 
19 Health Services, id., at para. 20. 
20 Supra, note 16. 
21 Id., at para. 133. 
22 Id., at para. 139; see also paras. 133-138. 
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A consideration of this fundamental question led Rothstein J. to conclude 
that the Court should overrule Health Services. His reasons were that 
Health Services addressed an issue of constitutional law and was thus 
“not susceptible to being corrected in a lasting way by the legislative 
branch”;23 Health Services “strayed significantly from earlier sound 
precedents with respect to the purpose of Charter protection for freedom 
of association;”24 the constitutionalization of collective bargaining was, 
in his view, “unworkable”;25 there had been “intense academic criticism” 
of Health Services;26 and, finally, Health Services was wrongly decided.27 
The plurality responded to Rothstein J.’s judgment at length.28 
The contrast in the approaches is best reflected in these two pas-
sages. The first is from the judgment of Rothstein J.: 
First, the error in Health Services concerns a question of 
constitutional law. Thus, not only does it go to one of the foundational 
principles of our legal system, but it is not susceptible to being 
corrected in a lasting way by the legislative branch. While s. 33 of the 
Charter may allow Parliament or the legislatures to suspend, 
temporarily, the force of this Court’s ruling, history over the last two 
decades demonstrates that resort to s. 33 by legislatures has been 
exceedingly rare. Health Services will, if left to stand, set out abiding 
principles of constitutional law. Only the Court may correct this error 
in fundamental principle. As noted in Planned Parenthood, it is 
“common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an ‘inexorable 
command,’ and certainly it is not such in every constitutional case” 
(p. 854). The jurisprudence of this Court contains similar observations. 
Because the Charter involves the most fundamental principles 
underlying our law, it is particularly important that its provisions be 
correctly interpreted. 
[McLachlin C.J.C.] and LeBel J. say that the constitutional nature of 
Health Services should only be a final consideration with respect to 
overruling difficult cases (para. 58). In my respectful view, and as my 
reasons will endeavour to demonstrate, there are no shortage of reasons 
to believe that Health Services is problematic on other grounds. 
                                                                                                             
23 Id., at para. 141. 
24 Id., at paras. 144, 152-171. 
25 Id., at paras. 145, 256-269. 
26 Id., at para. 146. 
27 Id., at paras. 151-296. 
28 Id., at paras. 52-96. 
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Relying on Henry, my colleagues also warn that this Court should be 
wary of overruling Health Services because doing so might have the 
potential to diminish Charter protection (para. 58, citing Henry, at 
para. 44). They say that this consideration “militate[s] in favour of 
upholding” Health Services (para. 58). However, the Court cannot be 
oblivious to errors in prior decisions. When considering overruling, the 
Court must balance correctness and certainty. If there is a potential 
diminishment arising from correcting prior error, that is a reason to be 
cautious, not a reason to forego correcting prior error altogether. 
Arguably, as Health Services itself strayed from prior precedent, 
returning to those prior precedents would promote certainty. However, 
even if certainty would favour retaining Health Services, in this case 
the need for a constitutionally correct answer is paramount.29 
The response of the plurality decision written by the Chief Justice and 
LeBel J. is as follows: 
Our colleague correctly recognizes at the outset of his reasons that 
overturning a precedent of this Court is a step not to be lightly 
undertaken. We would note that as we understand the law (see above), 
rejection of Health Services implies rejection of Dunmore as well, since 
the two cases rest on the same fundamental logic. 
The seriousness of overturning two recent precedents of this Court, 
representing the considered views of firm majorities, cannot be 
overstated. This is particularly so given their recent vintage. Health 
Services was issued only four years ago, and, when this appeal was 
argued, only two years had passed. 
Rothstein J. suggests that since Health Services deals with 
constitutional law, the Court should be more willing to overturn it 
(paras. 141-43). In our respectful view, this argument is not persuasive. 
The constitutional nature of a decision is not a primary consideration 
when deciding whether or not to overrule, but at best a final 
consideration in difficult cases. Indeed, the fact that Health Services 
relates to a constitutional Charter right may militate in favour of 
upholding this past decision. As Binnie J. stated on behalf of a 
unanimous Court in R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, 
“[t]he Court should be particularly careful before reversing a precedent 
where the effect is to diminish Charter protection” (para. 44). Justice 
                                                                                                             
29 Id., at paras. 141-143. 
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Rothstein’s proposed interpretation of s. 2(d) of the Charter would 
diminish the scope of the s. 2(d) right.30 
There are some interesting lessons to be learned from this “dialogue” 
between the two factions of the Court in Fraser. (These points are 
relevant here, and will also bear on our discussion under the topic of 
vertical stare decisis.) 
The first is Rothstein J.’s very, and arguably ironic, “activist” stance 
insofar as he was so ready to overturn a decision of the Court on which 
the ink had barely dried. It seemed to be his view that the balance always 
favours “correctness” over “certainty”. He seemed to share the view, 
expressed most pithily by Lord Atkin in 1933, that: “Finality is a good 
thing but justice is a better.”31 We agree with that. However, the Health 
Services decision was, itself, made on the same basis. That is, the 
majority in Health Services overturned the labour trilogy because it 
considered the labour trilogy incorrect for various reasons. So this 
dialogue does not reflect a difference in opinion as to the paramount 
importance of being correct in constitutional matters, but rather a 
difference in opinion as to which interpretation of section 2(d) was “the” 
correct one. 
Second, it is important to read what the plurality said about stare 
decisis in Fraser keeping three points in mind: first, the plurality is 
speaking about the implications of overturning two very recent majority 
decisions of the Court; second, it is speaking as a court that need only 
ever concern itself with horizontal stare decisis; and, third, it is speaking 
as the very court that just overturned the labour trilogy on the basis that it 
was simply incorrect. Thus, when the plurality speaks about the serious-
ness of overturning precedent, it is speaking about the particular folly of 
revisiting the issue every two years. That is an observation about there 
being a threshold need for a modicum of functional stability within the 
judicial system for it to operate at all. When the plurality goes on to state 
that the fact that the issue is a constitutional one does not make revisita-
tion in the circumstances any more appropriate, it must be kept in mind 
that it is saying that even a desire for correctness in constitutional matters 
might not justify a pace of revisitation that threatens the system itself. 
Further, the plurality is speaking as a court of ultimate authority — as a 
court that has an absolute right to overrule itself if and when it has a 
genuine realization of error. To such a court, the additional fact that any 
                                                                                                             
30 Id., at paras. 56-58. 
31 Ras Behari Lal v. King Emperor, [1933] All E.R. Rep. 723, at 726 (P.C.). 
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given case is constitutional might indeed be largely irrelevant, given that 
it has the right to depart from its own decisions at will in any event to 
correct errors. Taking the facts and context into consideration, nothing 
the plurality says in Fraser detracts from the fundamental point estab-
lished in Health Services: i.e., that it is the role and duty of the Court to 
provide what it believes to be a correct interpretation of the Charter, even 
if that involves admitting long-standing and oft-repeated past judicial 
error. 
It is acknowledged that the plurality also said that “the fact that 
Health Services relates to a constitutional Charter right may militate in 
favour of upholding this past decision”.32 However, that statement must 
not be taken out of its specific context — that is, that revisiting Health 
Services and reverting to the labour trilogy would diminish constitutional 
rights currently protected under the Health Services decision. The 
plurality was not expressing a view that the Court should, in general, 
hesitate to revisit Charter decisions. To take a broader interpretation of 
what the plurality said in Fraser, and to assert that they held that the 
constitutional nature of the decision is a reason for following precedent 
in general, would fail to account for the Court’s fundamentally motivat-
ing concern in Health Services, where the primary reason for reversing 
the labour trilogy was not merely the fact that these decisions were 
wrong, but that they were wrong in a manner contrary to the rights and 
freedoms protected by the Charter. Likewise Dickson C.J.C. in R. v. 
Bernard, while acknowledging the importance of stare decisis, nonethe-
less held that the Charter was one of four factors that would allow the 
Court to depart from a previous decision: “The special mandate of the 
Charter has been found by the Court to require reconsideration of its 
own past decisions, and, where necessary, to overrule those decisions 
which fail to reflect Charter values.”33 
As noted, the factions in Fraser disagreed on the “correct” interpre-
tation of the Charter. However, what we wish to emphasize is that both 
sides were, in fact, agreed that absent a set of circumstances that would 
undermine the legitimacy and workability of the judicial process (a 
threshold that in our submission must be an incredibly hard one to crest), 
precedent should not be an obstacle to ensuring constitutional behaviour 
by government. 
                                                                                                             
32 Fraser, supra, note 16, at para. 58. 
33 [1988] S.C.J. No. 96, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833, at para. 34 (S.C.C.). 
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However, the real concern of this paper lies with how the doctrine of 
stare decisis should apply in its vertical convention in the Charter 
context, with particular regard to giving due consideration to section 52 
of the Charter, and it is to that topic that we now turn our attention. 
2. Vertical Convention of Stare Decisis 
The vertical convention of stare decisis holds that lower courts are 
bound by the decisions of higher courts in their hierarchy. Thus the 
superior court of a given province is bound by the decisions of the courts 
of appeal of that province, and both are bound by decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Canada and “pre-1949 decisions of the Judicial Com-
mittee of the Privy Council (J.C.P.C.) that have not been subsequently 
overruled by the Supreme Court of Canada”.34 
The vertical convention of stare decisis took on central importance 
in Bedford.35 That case concerned the constitutional validity of three 
provisions of the Criminal Code:36 section 210, which prohibits the 
operation of common bawdy houses, section 212(1)(j), which prohibits 
living on the avails of prostitution, and section 213(1)(c), which prohibits 
communicating in public for the purpose of prostitution. These provi-
sions were challenged on the basis of section 7 of the Charter. The 
communication provision was also challenged on the basis of section 
2(b) of the Charter. 
Twenty years ago, in the Prostitution Reference,37 the Supreme Court 
of Canada found that the communication provision constituted a viola-
tion of the section 2(b) protection for freedom of expression, and further 
found that violation to be justified under section 1 of the Charter. Both 
the communication provision and the bawdy house provision were found 
to infringe the section 7 right to liberty, and both infringements were held 
to be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Canada 
argued that the plaintiffs in Bedford ONSC38 were precluded from 
challenging the bawdy house and communication provisions by the 
Prostitution Reference and the doctrine of stare decisis. At the hearing 
before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Himel J. did not consider 
                                                                                                             
34 “Precedent Unbound?”, supra, note 13, at 138. 
35 Supra, note 8. 
36 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. 
37 Prostitution Reference, supra, note 9. 
38 Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] O.J. No. 4057, 327 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Ont. 
S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Bedford ONSC”]. 
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herself bound by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in the 
Prostitution Reference with respect to either section 7 or section 2(b). 
She held: 
The Prostitution Reference is prima facie binding on this court. 
... 
However, Justice Laskin suggested a flexible approach to the 
application of the principle of stare decisis, as a rigid adherence might 
lead to “injustices in individual cases, continued application of legal 
principles long since outdated as society has changed, and uncertainty 
bred by judges who draw overly fine distinctions to avoid stare 
decisis.” 
... 
I am persuaded that I am not foreclosed from hearing the challenge 
based on s. 7 of the Charter as the issues argued in this case are 
different than those argued in the Prostitution Reference. Although “the 
principles of fundamental justice are to be found in the basic tenets of 
our legal system” (Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, per 
Lamer J. at p. 503), the principles at issue in this case were not clearly 
articulated as such when the reference was heard. The jurisprudence on 
s. 7 of the Charter has evolved considerably in the last two decades. 
I am also persuaded that I may reconsider whether s. 213(1)(c) of the 
Criminal Code is in violation of s. 2(b) of the Charter.39 
The reasons she gave for this latter point were that there was a need 
to reconsider constitutional interpretation because the Constitution is a 
“living tree” and the constitutional amendment process was difficult;40 
she noted that the Supreme Court of Canada had the authority to revisit 
its previous decisions;41 relying on the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
decision in Wakeford v. Canada (Attorney General),42 she considered 
whether there was an indication that the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decision was open to reconsideration either because of a shift in the 
jurisprudence or developments in public policy or new facts.43 She 
concluded: 
                                                                                                             
39 Bedford ONSC, id., at paras. 66, 68, 75-76. 
40 Bedford ONSC, id., at para. 77. 
41 Id., at para. 78. 
42 [2001] O.J. No. 390, 81 C.R.R. (2d) 342 (Ont. C.A.). 
43 Bedford ONSC, supra, note 38, at paras. 79-80. 
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In my view, the s. 1 analysis conducted in the Prostitution Reference 
ought to be revisited given the breadth of evidence that has been 
gathered over the course of the intervening twenty years. Furthermore, 
it may be that the social, political, and economic assumptions 
underlying the Prostitution Reference are no longer valid today. Indeed, 
several western democracies have made legal reforms decriminalizing 
prostitution to varying degrees. As well, the type of expression at issue 
in this case is different from that considered in the Prostitution 
Reference. Here, the expression at issue is that which would allow 
prostitutes to screen potential clients for a propensity for violence. I 
conclude, therefore, that it is appropriate in this case to decide these 
issues based upon the voluminous record before me. As will become 
evident following a review of the evidence filed by the parties, there is 
a substantial amount of research that was not before the Supreme Court 
in 1990.44 
The Court of Appeal unanimously agreed that Himel J. was not fore-
closed from considering the section 7 issues;45 however, they held that 
she erred with respect to whether or not she was bound on the freedom of 
expression issue. The Court explained that while stare decisis was 
traditionally only applied to the ratio decidendi of a decision, the scope 
of the doctrine had been expanded to encompass some obiter dicta: 
However, the traditional division between ratio and obiter has 
become more nuanced. It is now recognized that there is a spectrum of 
authoritativeness on which the statements of an appellate court may be 
placed. Justice Binnie, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, stated 
in R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, at para. 57: 
The issue in each case, to return to the Halsbury question, is 
what did the case decide? Beyond the ratio decidendi which... 
is generally rooted in the facts, the legal point decided by this 
                                                                                                             
44 Id., at paras. 66-68, 75-83. 
45 The Court of Appeal was careful to note that the Prostitution Reference, supra, note 9 
considered a physical (as opposed to economic) liberty interest and that there was no binding 
decision with respect to security of the person. In Bedford, the parties agreed that the liberty interest 
was engaged and the respondents argued that their security of the person interest was engaged. 
Further, in the Prostitution Reference the only principle of fundamental justice considered was 
vagueness and the perceived inconsistency in Parliament’s response to prostitution. In Bedford the 
respondents relied on the principles of arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality. In 
light of all this, the Court concluded: “It cannot be said that the Prostitution Reference decided the 
substantive s. 7 issues before the application judge in this case. Therefore, stare decisis did not 
apply, and the application judge did not err by conducting her own analysis and coming to her own 
conclusion.”: Bedford, supra, note 8, at paras. 65-70. 
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Court may be as narrow as the jury instruction at issue in 
Sellars or as broad as the Oakes test. [Emphasis added.] 
Justice Doherty, writing for a unanimous five-judge panel of this 
court, discussed Henry in the recent decision of R. v. Prokofiew, 2010 
ONCA 423, (2010), 100 O.R. (3d) 401, leave to appeal to S.C.C. 
granted, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 298, heard and reserved November 8, 
2011, at para. 19: 
The question then becomes the following: how does one 
distinguish between binding obiter in a Supreme Court of 
Canada judgment and non-binding obiter? In Henry, at para. 53, 
Binnie J. explains that one must ask, “What does the case 
actually decide?” Some cases decide only a narrow point in a 
specific factual context. Other cases — including the vast 
majority of Supreme Court of Canada decisions — decide 
broader legal propositions and, in the course of doing so, set 
out legal analyses that have application beyond the facts of 
the particular case. [Emphasis added.] 
These authorities delineate the boundary between binding and 
non-binding statements of the Supreme Court, and they do so based on 
an inquiry into the Court’s substantive reasoning process. Applying 
Henry and Prokofiew, the question becomes: what did the Prostitution 
Reference decide?46 
With respect to the trial judge’s decision, the Court held: 
First, the application judge misconceived the principle of stare 
decisis when she described the Prostitution Reference as only “prima 
facie binding on this court.” With respect, it was much more than that. 
The Supreme Court’s decision that s. 213(1)(c) of the Criminal Code is 
a justified limit on freedom of expression was fully binding on the 
application judge, as there was no suggestion that it had been expressly 
or by implication overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme 
Court. In short, it is for the Supreme Court, and only that court, to 
overrule one of its own decisions.47 
The Court of Appeal held that Himel J. also erred in equating her 
position, “when asked to reconsider a binding decision of the Supreme 
Court, with the position of a court that is asked to reconsider one of its 
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note 13, at 138-41. 
47 Bedford, id., at para. 75. 
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own prior decisions”,48 and “by holding that the binding authority of the 
Prostitution Reference could be displaced by recasting the nature of the 
expression at issue as promoting safety, and not merely commercial 
expression”.49 The Court of Appeal specifically held that it was an error 
for Himel J. to conclude that a change in evidence and legislative facts 
was sufficient to trigger a reconsideration of a section 1 analysis by a 
lower court.50 
It is never an easy or comfortable position to take to say that a five-
member division of the Ontario Court of Appeal was wrong, especially 
one comprised of individual jurists of the calibre of Doherty, Rosenberg, 
MacPherson, Cronk and Feldman JJ.A. Nevertheless, with the greatest 
respect, we are of the view that the Court did err in overturning Himel J. 
and in so erring it missed an opportunity to participate in a transforma-
tive moment in Charter litigation. The error stemmed from assuming the 
common law approach to stare decisis can be transported directly and 
without alteration into the Charter context. In other words, the error 
consisted of the failure to consider whether the traditional approach to 
stare decisis is unduly broad in the Charter context, given the nature of 
Charter litigation and the imperative of constitutional supremacy. 
In our opinion, section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 effectively 
imposes a constitutional duty on a trial court to distinguish, where 
appropriate, a prior Charter decision on the basis of a change in legisla-
tive and social fact.51 To fail to distinguish a prior Charter decision where 
such distinguishing is warranted amounts to a refusal by a trial court to 
subject a law to Charter scrutiny. Further, the trial court’s constitutional 
duty coincides with an institutional logic which also augurs in favour of 
decision-makers of first instance conducting the initial Charter analysis.52 
                                                                                                             
48 Id., at para. 81. 
49 Id., at para. 82. 
50 Id., at para. 83. It must be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada can itself reconsider 
Charter issues in light of changed circumstances: see for example, in the context of s. 7, United 
States of America v. Burns, [2001] S.C.J. No. 8, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 2001 SCC 7, at para. 144 
(S.C.C.). However, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that notwithstanding that the Supreme Court of 
Canada had this power, the application judge erroneously equated her role, as a court of first 
instance, with that of the Supreme Court of Canada (at paras. 75-80). 
51 Section 52(1) provides: “The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and 
any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsis-
tency, of no force or effect.” 
52 See, for example, Conway, supra, note 3; Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Assn. v. Douglas 
College, [1990] S.C.J. No. 124, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570 (S.C.C.); Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour 
Relations Board), [1991] S.C.J. No. 42, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5 (S.C.C.); Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada 
(Employment and Immigration Commission), [1991] S.C.J. No. 41, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 22 (S.C.C.); see 
also Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation 
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We turn to a consideration of how these principles may be reconciled 
with the doctrine of stare decisis. 
III. RECONCILING STARE DECISIS WITH  
CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 
At first blush, a stark tension may appear between the emphasis 
placed by the common law doctrine of stare decisis on consistency, 
certainty and predictability in the law, and the assertion that adjudicators 
of first instance may be under a constitutional imperative to apply the 
highest law (the Constitution) to the specific set of legislative and social 
facts before them. This was the tension at the heart of the Bedford case 
and it is the same tension now in play in the Carter case. 
Having regard to this constitutional imperative may not necessitate 
abandonment of stare decisis in Charter matters, although one might be 
tempted to go that far. Indeed it strikes us as being very plausible to 
argue that in Charter cases stare decisis should be more akin to the 
horizontal variety than the vertical such that prior decisions “are not 
strictly binding, but should be followed unless there are compelling 
reasons to overrule them”.53 At a minimum, however, the application of 
stare decisis in the Charter context must be tempered, both because it is a 
common law doctrine and thus should be subordinate to the dictates of 
the Constitution, and because constitutional cases are, in some respects, 
materially different from non-constitutional cases. 
That the common law needs to be adapted — or perhaps “side-
stepped” — to meet the demands of the Constitution is far from a novel 
proposition. A relatively recent example of the Supreme Court of Canada 
rejecting a common law rule in favour of the principle of constitutional-
ity is Kingstreet Investments Ltd. v. New Brunswick (Finance).54 At issue 
in Kingstreet was the appropriate remedy in circumstances where the 
government attempts to retain unconstitutionally collected taxes. The 
                                                                                                             
Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (S.C.C.); Paul v. British Columbia 
(Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 (S.C.C.); Quebec (Attorney 
General) v. Quebec (Human Rights Tribunal), [2004] S.C.J. No. 35, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 223 (S.C.C.); 
Okwuobi v. Lester B. Pearson School Board; Casimir v. Quebec (Attorney General); Zorrilla v. 
Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 16, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 257 (S.C.C.). 
53 “Precedent Unbound?”, supra, note 13, at 137. 
54 [2007] S.C.J. No. 1, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kingstreet”]. 
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Court held that: “The Court’s central concern must be to guarantee 
respect for constitutional principles.”55 The Court also held: 
When the government collects and retains taxes pursuant to ultra 
vires legislation, it undermines the rule of law. To permit the Crown to 
retain an ultra vires tax would condone a breach of this most 
fundamental constitutional principle. As a result, a citizen who has 
made a payment pursuant to ultra vires legislation has a right to 
restitution: P. Birks, “Restitution from the Executive: A Tercentenary 
Footnote to the Bill of Rights”, in P. D. Finn, ed., Essays on Restitution 
(1990), c. 6, at p. 168.56 
The Court held that the government must repay unconstitutionally 
collected taxes. In doing so, it rejected the obiter statements of La Forest 
J. on behalf of three members of the Court in Air Canada v. British 
Columbia57 who proposed an immunity rule for such situations. As well, 
the Court declined to base the remedy on the doctrine of unjust enrich-
ment. The Court explained that although unjust enrichment claims may 
be appropriate against the government in some cases: 
... The taxpayers in this case [have] recourse to a remedy as a matter of 
constitutional right. This remedy is in fact the only appropriate remedy 
because it raises important constitutional principles which would be 
ignored by treating the claim under another category of restitution....58 
Thus, the Court accepted that neither the common law nor equitable 
doctrines should operate to shield unconstitutional government action 
from review.59 
                                                                                                             
55 Id., at para. 14. 
56 Id., at para. 15. 
57 [1989] S.C.J. No. 44, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Air Canada”]. 
58 Kingstreet, supra, note 54, at para. 34. 
59 The common law of standing is but another example of a doctrine which had to be 
adapted to meet the demands of the Constitution: Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [1975] 
S.C.J. No. 45, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 (S.C.C.). Of course, the same-sex marriage litigation is an even 
more recent and outstanding example of the common law having to be amended to comply with the 
Charter: see, e.g., EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (sub nom. Barbeau v. British 
Columbia (Attorney General)), [2003] B.C.J. No. 994, 225 D.L.R. (4th) 472 (B.C.C.A.); Halpern v. 
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no 2593, [2004] R.J.Q. 851 (Que. C.A.); Dunbar v. Yukon, [2004] Y.J. No. 61, 122 C.R.R. (2d) 149 
(Y.T.S.C.); Vogel v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] M.J. No. 418 (Man. Q.B.); Boutilier v. 
Nova Scotia (Attorney General), [2004] N.S.J. No. 357 (N.S.S.C.); and W. (N.) v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2004] S.J. No. 669, 246 D.L.R. (4th) 345 (Sask. Q.B.). In part as a result of these prior 
decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada exercised its discretion not to answer the question of 
whether the opposite-sex requirement for marriage for civil purposes as established by the common 
law and set out for Quebec in s. 5 of the Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 
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We say that respect for constitutional principles must be the govern-
ing consideration when the issue is whether or to what extent lower 
courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts. 
Yet we do not rest on that point alone. As noted above, the point at 
which constitutional cases most differ from non-constitutional cases is in 
the Charter context and, within that context, in the section 1 justification 
analysis. This is reflected in the fact that the Court articulated the 
“contextual approach”60 to the Charter and in its later description of 
context as “the indispensable handmaiden” to a proper application of 
section 1.61 It is in Charter cases, and especially under section 1, that 
judicial reasoning is deeply intertwined with the social and legislative 
facts “that establish the purpose and background of legislation, including 
its social, economic and cultural context”.62 The Supreme Court of 
Canada’s repeated warnings about the importance of determining Charter 
cases in a full factual matrix recognize that these facts are a driving 
consideration in Charter decisions. The central importance of legislative 
and social facts in section 1 Charter decisions is, in turn, the reason why 
a prior section 1 analysis is only binding to the extent that a fundamen-
tally similar factual matrix continues to exist.63 
It is a trial court’s duty to apply the Charter; in order to fulfil that 
duty, a trial court must ensure that it does not foreclose itself, by over-
broad application of precedent, from considering as cases of first 
instance matters that should be adjudicated under the Charter on their 
own, contemporary, social and legislative facts. That is, the duty to apply 
the Charter as the highest law of the land gives rise to a correlative duty 
to distinguish precedents that are, in reality, based on a social or legisla-
tive factual matrix that no longer exists. In short, a Charter analysis 
regarding section 1 inherently has potential for obsolescence, and a trial 
court must be particularly alive to that possibility. 
                                                                                                             
2001, c. 4, was consistent with the Charter: Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] S.C.J. No. 75, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 698, at paras. 61-72 (S.C.C.). 
60 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 
1326, at paras. 43-52 (S.C.C.). 
61 Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 877, at para. 87 (S.C.C.). 
62 Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] S.C.J. No. 92, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086, at 
para. 27 (S.C.C.). 
63 See, e.g., MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] S.C.J. No. 88, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357, at paras. 9-11 
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In circumstances where an infringement of a Charter right has been 
previously found and justified under section 1, and a trial court is 
satisfied that the relevant legislative and social facts underpinning the 
case before it are materially and significantly different from those that 
were relied upon by an earlier but higher court to justify the law, the trial 
court has a constitutional obligation to determine whether the law is still 
constitutionally valid. In making this determination, the trial court is not 
overruling decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada; rather, it is 
determining an issue never before decided, and is therefore not bound by 
stare decisis especially as we believe it ought to be applied in constitu-
tional cases (assuming it applies at all). This is not a radical departure 
from the doctrine of stare decisis, but rather an application of the 
doctrine that takes into account the special role that legislative and social 
facts play in Charter cases. Stare decisis in its traditional form recognizes 
that the process of judicial reasoning can be fundamentally different 
because of different jurisprudential developments.64 Given the fact that 
judicial reasoning in a Charter section 1 analysis is “rooted in the 
facts”,65 how can it not be the case that the process of judicial reasoning 
in this context is fundamentally different when there are fundamentally 
different legislative and social facts? 
The Ontario Court of Appeal appears to flatly disagree. However, we 
respectfully take the position that the Court of Appeal effectively turned 
constitutional supremacy on its head in Bedford when it held that “the 
need for a robust application of stare decisis is particularly important in 
the context of Charter litigation”.66 With respect, this would allow the 
“tail” of stare decisis to “wag the dog” of section 52. 
We fully agree with the approach taken by the trial judge in Bedford 
ONSC. A trial judge should regard a prior higher court decision on the 
same Charter point as prima facie binding. However, if there is sufficient 
factual difference pleaded to merit proceeding to an evidentiary hearing, 
a trial should be permitted. If, following that trial, the trial judge is 
persuaded that there has been a significant and material change in facts, 
the trial judge should make a finding to that effect. Where the trial judge 
makes such a finding, we argue that the trial judge is then constitution-
ally obliged to carry out a full Charter analysis based on the record 
before him or her and to make all of the requisite findings of fact, mixed 
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fact and law, and law that he or she would make in the normal course. An 
appellate court will then be in a position to carry out appellate review, 
including review of whether the trial judge correctly concluded that there 
had been a significant and material change in the facts. If the trial judge’s 
finding in the latter respect was wrong, the decision of the appeal court 
may be that the trial judge ought to have held the matter foreclosed by 
stare decisis. However, if the trial judge’s finding in the latter respect 
was correct, the appeal court will be situated to carry out an appeal in the 
normal course. 
In Bedford, the Ontario Court of Appeal appears to contemplate that 
the trial judge should agree to hold the hearing, but simply perform the 
role of finder of fact, setting out bare evidentiary conclusions and then 
pushing the matter up towards the Supreme Court of Canada.67 As 
already discussed, it is our position that a trial court that takes this 
approach fails in its duty to determine whether the purported precedent 
is, in actuality, an authoritative precedent in the Charter context. Further, 
such a trial court also risks failing in its duty under section 52 of the 
Constitution. 
We add to this a further institutional concern, which is that we do not 
believe it is realistic to expect a trial court, which would be limited on 
the approach articulated by the Court of Appeal in Bedford to making 
only findings of fact, to make sufficient findings to ever truly enable an 
appellate court to carry out a section 1 analysis as if it stood in the shoes 
of the trial court. The findings and analysis that go into determining 
whether laws are rationally connected, minimally impairing or dispropor-
tionate — questions of mixed law and fact — are the unique province of 
the adjudicator of first instance — the person most intimately familiar 
with the entirety of the evidence and the person who has had the benefit 
of full argument from the parties regarding that evidence and its import. 
Taking Bedford and Carter as examples, these cases involved vast 
evidence, lay and expert, regarding the operation and impact of the law 
on individuals, institutions and society, as well as the alternatives in 
place in other jurisdictions. In our opinion, the trial judge is far and away 
the person best situated to, for example, find and weigh the salutary and 
deleterious effects of the legislation. This is the very point that the 
Supreme Court of Canada has been making for years in asserting that 
there must be a proper record and findings at the trial level in order for a 
Charter matter to proceed. The approach endorsed by the Ontario Court 
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of Appeal in Bedford puts the appellate courts at an extreme disadvantage 
by depriving them of findings at first instance. 
The Ontario Court of Appeal did not address the concerns raised 
above in its decision in Bedford. Instead, its reasoning focuses on what 
are mainly floodgates concerns. With respect, under scrutiny, none of 
those floodgates concerns is particularly valid, let alone compelling. The 
Court held: 
In our view ... Given the nature of the s. 1 test, especially in 
controversial matters, the evidence and legislative facts will continue to 
evolve, as will values, attitudes and perspectives. But this evolution 
alone is not sufficient to trigger a reconsideration in the lower courts. 
If it were otherwise, every time a litigant came upon new evidence 
or a fresh perspective from which to view the problem, the lower courts 
would be forced to reconsider the case despite authoritative holdings 
from the Supreme Court on the very points at issue. This would 
undermine the legitimacy of Charter decisions and the rule of law 
generally. It would be particularly problematic in the criminal law, 
where citizens and law enforcement have the right to expect that they 
may plan their conduct in accordance with the law as laid down by the 
Supreme Court. Such an approach to constitutional interpretation yields 
not a vibrant living tree but a garden of annuals to be regularly 
uprooted and replaced.68 
We agree that a lower court should not be entitled to ignore “authorita-
tive holdings from the Supreme Court on the very points in issue”, but 
that raises the question of when and in what circumstances a Supreme 
Court decision can be regarded as authoritative. It is our position that 
where a trial court is satisfied that the factual matrix before it is signifi-
cantly and materially different than that underlying a prior section 1 
analysis, it should not regard the prior decision as authoritative. If the 
facts are materially different, it makes no juridical sense to bar the trial 
court from proceeding to a decision based on the new facts. 
We also agree that a lower court cannot refuse to follow a Supreme 
Court precedent “every time a litigant came upon new evidence or a 
fresh perspective from which to view the problem”. We are not proposing 
such an approach. We are talking here of cases in which a plaintiff has 
succeeded in persuading a court that an evidentiary trial is worthwhile 
and then, in the context of that trial, has succeeded in putting evidence 
                                                                                                             
68 Id., at paras. 83-84. 
(2012), 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) STARE DECISIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY 81 
before the court that is not merely “fresh”, but rather that demonstrably 
establishes that the prior factual matrix has materially changed. We are 
not contemplating cases where a subsequent litigant has merely discov-
ered evidence that a previous litigant was not aware of or failed to 
adduce. The evidentiary hurdle we are positing is not a slight one, and 
there is no reason to suspect that many cases would successfully clear it. 
We appreciate that constitutional litigation should not “yield a garden 
of annuals to be regularly uprooted and replaced”, but submit that that is 
not an appropriate metaphor given the evidentiary process and threshold 
described above. We would say that the Ontario Court of Appeal, in its 
effort to avoid gardening annuals, is preventing trial courts from dis-
charging their duty to prune and tend the living tree that is the Constitu-
tion.69 Trial courts should not be expected to ignore dead branches. 
Further, citizens invoking their fundamental rights should not be asked 
to stand by patiently while trial courts wilfully do so. It must not be 
forgotten that constitutional law affects people — the people of Canada, 
not merely the parties to the litigation — in a fundamental manner. There 
can be no better illustration than the Carter case: the Charter can touch 
upon matters of life and death. The practical reality is that in many, if not 
all, Charter cases “[t]he denial of early access to remedies is a denial of 
an appropriate and just remedy.”70 Thus a litigant who must wait until his 
or her case winds its way through the various levels of court and up to 
the Supreme Court of Canada may well be deprived of any meaningful 
vindication of his or her rights. 
So while we understand the Ontario Court of Appeal’s concern, 
noted above, that it may be “particularly problematic in the criminal law, 
where citizens ... have the right to expect that they may plan their 
conduct in accordance with the law as laid down by the Supreme 
Court”71 for a lower court to find conduct long held to be lawful to 
suddenly be criminal, it does not seem problematic at all for a court to 
conclude that laws long thought to be constitutional (and conduct 
contrary to those laws to be criminal) to be unconstitutional (and thus the 
conduct perfectly lawful). As for changing the expectation of those 
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involved in law enforcement, that, with respect, does not seem to warrant 
the same consideration. The Charter was not designed to protect govern-
ment rights. 
Finally, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Bedford expressed concern 
that allowing a trial court to depart from a higher court’s decision simply 
because of a change in legislative and social facts could “undermine the 
legitimacy of Charter decisions and the rule of law generally”.72 We fail 
to see how that would be the result. We note that section 33 of the 
Charter obliges a government that invokes the override provision to 
justify an infringement to revisit the matter every five years. In the face 
of that entrenched understanding of obsolescence, it is difficult to see 
how or why the citizen or government should regard a section 1 revisita-
tion triggered by a finding of significant and material change in facts as a 
threat to the rule of law. Further, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s 
suggestion, revisitation in such circumstances does not throw the status 
quo into disorder any more than would be the case under a Charter 
challenge of first instance. 
Thus from a doctrinal, institutional and remedial perspective, it 
makes sense that trial courts faced with constitutional issues, even 
constitutional issues that have arisen before but on substantially different 
facts, should and must determine the constitutional questions at stake in 
the case on the facts before them. This is especially the case when 
section 1 of the Charter is the pivotal provision in play and the changed 
facts in question are legislative and social. Appellate courts can weigh in 
in the usual course. This is the only approach that can reconcile section 
52 with the doctrine of stare decisis. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We return to the question of why the writers considered this topic 
appropriate for inclusion in a series addressing “transformative” mo-
ments in Charter litigation. As indicated in the introduction, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has built up three decades of Charter jurisprudence. 
However, the Charter is not the only thing that is 30 years older. Cana-
dian society has itself changed substantially, in many respects dramati-
cally, in that same time frame. The question that we have sought to 
address is the proper role of the trial courts in 2012 (and beyond) when 
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faced with a claim that a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision no 
longer speaks to the reality of Canadian society. 
As exemplified by Health Services, the Supreme Court of Canada is 
quite prepared to recognize its own youthful folly. However, we have not 
analyzed the question of whether it is for that Court alone to correct its 
own mistakes. Instead, we have asked what should happen where it is 
alleged not that a prior decision is wrong, but rather that it no longer 
“fits” the social and legislative facts. As we have attempted to outline 
above, in Charter litigation, social and legislative facts are especially key 
under section 1 of the Charter. Cases that seek to revisit these issues in 
the face of a prior Supreme Court of Canada decision — cases like 
Bedford and Carter — do so because the earlier decision held the 
challenged law to be constitutional notwithstanding the infringement of 
Charter rights. The issue raised before the second trial court in such cases 
is whether the infringement in question is still justifiable. 
Treating precedents like the Prostitution Reference and Rodriguez as 
absolutely binding not only makes it difficult, expensive and in some 
cases ultimately futile for the committed to obtain a constitutional 
remedy, it also operates as a significant disincentive, preventing the less 
committed from making the attempt at all. That is a state of affairs that 
ultimately operates to relieve the government of the obligation to justify 
continuing infringements on Charter rights. It also deprives the radical 
and liberatory principles enunciated in the Charter of their progressive 
promise. 
This is an issue of our time. The Carter and Bedford cases signal that 
a threshold has been reached based on a combination of 30 years of 
social change and the now considerable volume of past jurisprudence. 
We have identified this is as a “transformative moment” in the potential 
sense. Now is the time when it will be decided to what degree our 
Charter past will be allowed to be an obstacle to our Charter future. 
V. AFTERWORD 
This paper was presented at the Osgoode Hall Conference on Consti-
tutional Cases in May 2012. The judgment in Carter was rendered just 
one month later in June 2012. In Carter, Smith J. concluded that Rodri-
guez had decided that Ms. Rodriguez was deprived of her section 7 
Charter rights to liberty and security of the person, but that these depriva-
tions were in accordance with the principle of fundamental justice that 
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laws not be arbitrary. However, Smith J. accepted the Carter plaintiffs’ 
arguments that the Supreme Court of Canada in Rodriguez had not 
considered whether the prohibition also engaged the right to life, and had 
not considered whether the section 7 deprivations were in accordance 
with principles of fundamental justice that laws not be overbroad or 
grossly disproportionate. 
Justice Smith also concluded that the decision in Rodriguez did not 
decide whether section 241(b) of the Criminal Code infringes section 15 
of the Charter; rather, the Court had simply assumed that section 15 was 
infringed and moved directly to a section 1 analysis. In Carter, the 
plaintiffs argued that that the final step in the section 1 analysis, balanc-
ing the salutary and deleterious effects of the legislation, had been 
changed as a result of the intervening Supreme Court of Canada decision 
in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony.73 Justice Smith 
accepted this argument. The Carter plaintiffs also argued that because of 
the existence of changed legislative and social facts, the section 1 
analysis in Rodriguez was, in any event, obsolete and not binding on that 
basis. For the purposes of this paper, and in light of the decision in 
Bedford discussed above, these are the stare decisis issues from Carter 
that bear most directly upon the topic of this paper. With respect to these 
points, Smith J. held: 
It is true, as the defendants submit, that the Supreme Court did not 
enunciate a new test. However, in my view Hutterian Brethren marks a 
substantive change, rather than the addition of a nuance. The Court 
made clear that the final step in the proportionality analysis is neither 
redundant nor a mere summary of the first two steps, although, as 
Professor Hogg observed, it had come to be viewed that way. Courts 
are to widen their perspective at the final stage to take full account of 
the deleterious effects of the infringement on individuals or groups, and 
determine whether the benefits of the legislation are worth that cost. 
That is a different question than whether the legislation is rationally 
connected to the government’s objective or impairs the rights as little as 
possible. 
I agree with the plaintiffs that the Supreme Court of Canada, in 
Hutterian Brethren, put life into the final balancing step in the analysis 
of proffered justifications for infringements of Charter rights. 
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In Bedford, it was not argued that the law with respect to s. 1 
analysis had evolved; only that the legislative and social facts had 
changed. 
I note as well that, while in principle a trial judge could find facts 
without conducting a legal analysis in order to create a record for 
appellate courts to decide section 1 issues, it would be an unusual 
exercise. Facts are not normally found in a legal vacuum — they are 
found in a context, for a reason and with a purpose. Indeed, without a 
legal framework, how is the primordial task of determining the 
relevance of evidence possible? Charter analysis is always to be 
contextual. Assessing justification under s. 1 is a particularly fact-
intensive process. Similarly, it might be said that finding facts for a s. 1 
inquiry is law-intensive, making reference to the governing legal 
principles essential. 
The existence of a different set of legislative and social facts on its 
own may not warrant a fresh s. 1 inquiry. However, it is unnecessary 
for me to say more about that point because I think that significantly 
and materially different legislative facts, along with a change in the 
legal principles to be applied, can. Because those conditions exist in 
this case, I will address the s. 1 arguments of the parties, particularly at 
the final two stages where minimal impairment and proportionality of 
effects are assessed.74 
Thus, it seems that Smith J. agreed with the Carter plaintiffs that the 
approach articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal was at least prob-
lematic. However, she ultimately declined to squarely address the issue 
of whether section 1’s built-in obsolescence could alone justify or require 
a court of first instance’s departure from Supreme Court of Canada 
precedent. It remains to be seen whether and on what grounds the 
decision in Carter will be appealed. It is entirely possible that the issue 
of stare decisis will remain central as the Bedford and Carter cases move 
forward. 
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